TehnoMil

By Caudillo:

In ianuarie 2025 s-a publicat raportul din partea Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation.

Gasim pe Wikipedia detalii despre aceasta institutie :

The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) is the principal staff assistant and adviser to the US Secretary of Defense on operational and live fire test and evaluation activities involving U.S. Department of Defense weapons systems.

Responsibilities

The director reports directly to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, with the following responsibilities:

• Development and dissemination of Department of Defense operational test and evaluation policy and procedures
• Review and analysis of operational test and evaluation results for Department of Defense acquisition programs
• Independent assessments of operational test and evaluation activities as it pertains to budgetary and financial issues for the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense, and the United States Congress
• Oversight to ensure the adequacy of operational test and evaluation for major Department of Defense acquisition programs and to confirm the operational effectiveness and suitability of the defense systems in combat use

Ce gasim in acest raport despre F-35, paginile 44-57:

2024Annual-Report

Raportul ne arata stadiul dezvoltarii F-35. Din pacate , F-35 este un avion foarte complex si de aici au aparut problemele. F-35 trebuie sa ajunga la varianta Block 4. Doar ca pentru asta trebuie sa treaca de la upgrade TR-2 la upgrade TR-3. Aici Lockheed Martin s-a impotmolit, asa cum apare la pg 44-45

In February 2024, DOT&E published a classified F-35 combined IOT&E and LFT&E report, supporting the Milestone C Defense Acquisition Board review in March. The report provides an independent assessment of the overall mission capability of the F-35 in the Block 3F configuration, in terms of its operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability. The report included a separate annex that provided an assessment of F-35 Block 4 operational testing which occurred following IOT&E. The program proceeded to full-rate production, based on an acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) signed by USD(A&S) in March 2024. The transition to full-rate production occurred in the middle of nearly a year-long pause in acceptance of production aircraft, as the program worked to achieve stability in the new hardware and software to the point where it met the acceptance standards of the Services, facilitating the aircraft’s delivery. Although Lockheed Martin planned to deliver the Lot 15 aircraft – the first lot with the new Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3) mission systems architecture – starting in July 2023, they had to put the aircraft in long-term parking because the mission systems software did not satisfactorily function on the TR-3 hardware. As a result, the Services, in coordination with the program office, refused to take delivery of TR-3-equipped aircraft until July 2024.

The F-35 development effort too was facing challenges in delivering reliable, fully functional software to the operational test (OT) teams. In February 2024, the United Operational Test Team (UOTT) called for a “stop test” of the software they were testing (30R08) – intended as the last version of software fielded on the TR-2 aircraft – due to stability problems, shortfalls in capability, and deficiencies they discovered. Quality escapes from the manufacturing and production processes (i.e., problems that should have been identified and corrected during the check-out and acceptance process for new aircraft) are still being identified in the field. The F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) has not adequately planned for OT of the upgraded TR-3 hardware configuration to be completed prior to delivering multiple TR-3 aircraft to field units. DOT&E assesses that dedicated operational testing of these aircraft will not occur until mid to late FY26, approximately two years after the configuration began delivery to the field.

Adica TR-3 trebuia livrat din iulie 2023 si POATE va fi livrat prin 2026, o intarziere enorma.Ca urmare, Pentagonul a refuzat F-35 , ceea ce a dus la o productie pe stoc a LM,  pana cand LM a scos TR-3 “truncated” , respectiv un TR-3 training.

Si aici apar alte probleme, din raport rezulta ca acest TR-3 truncated e lipsit de (unele?) capacitati de lupta ale TR-2 , pagina 46

To stabilize the performance on the new TR-3 hardware, the program developed a truncated version of software by disabling combat capabilities that had already been fielded on the TR-2 aircraft. In July 2024, a year after the planned delivery, the JPO, Services, and Lockheed Martin reached an agreement to allow the Services to start accepting TR-3 aircraft with the truncated software lacking these TR-2 capabilities. The U.S. Air Force accepted the first two TR-3 Lot 15 aircraft later that month, with an interim test software build of the truncated version, designated 40R01.351, that would allow pilots in the field to use the aircraft for training. According to the JPO, as of the end of FY24, the program had delivered 41 TR-3 aircraft. The limitations in terms of combat capability of these aircraft are not known, nor is the timeline on which the previously fielded capabilities (on the TR-2 aircraft) will be tested and provided to the newly delivered TR-3 aircraft.

Raportul mai are si niste grafice, date despre intretinerea F-35 cu unele concluzii, pg 55

Maintainability Trends The maintainability metrics for the U.S. F-35 fleet from FY15 through FY23 are shown in Figure 3, based on adjudicated data reported by the JPO. Since only partial maintainability data from FY24 were available due to the lag in adjudicating maintenance records, they were not included in this figure. This figure shows yearly average values for each metric for a given fiscal year, and the horizontal line indicates the threshold requirement. For maintainability metrics, lower values are better, indicating shorter average maintenance durations. For all variants, the average maintenance durations for the U.S. F-35 fleet are longer than the ORD requirements. There has been little improvement in these maintainability metrics since FY15. As of February 2024, no variant met the maintainability requirements. The mean corrective maintenance time for critical failures (MCMTCF) remains almost double or more than the threshold requirement. No variant showed significant improvement over the period, except for MCMTCF for the F-35A, which remains at nearly twice the required value. This metric measures the active maintenance touch labor time and cure times associated with repairs to LO materials required to correct only the subset of failures that prevent the F-35 from being able to perform a specific mission. It indicates the average time for maintainers to return an aircraft from Not Mission Capable to MC status.

Nu pot sa zic ca datele si graficele sunt incurajatoare, daca asa arata la americani , ma intreb cum vor arata la noi, ca daca ma uit la graficul asta de la pagina 52 chiar arata rau , cu Fully Mission Capable si Mission Capable sub linie si pe grafic scrie “Higher is better”

Mai scrie ceva in raport, tot la pagina 55,

F-35 aircraft mission systems instabilities can degrade mission performance and may require a pilot-initiated reset of mission systems in-flight, which could have severe consequences during combat, affecting overall mission reliability. ALIS does not currently have the capability to automatically log these events in the Computerized Maintenance Management System (CMMS). While pilots can manually document instability events, this occurs infrequently as the process is cumbersome and Service policy is to rely on an ALIS automated process.

Multiple ALIS cyber survivability deficiency reports were created in FY24 based on the FY23 testing, with an additional f inding still under evaluation. Several deficiency reports were closed. Many cyber survivability deficiencies remain across the F-35 program. To address the deficiencies, the JPO invested in cyber mitigations associated with recent UOTT testing, and key test findings are being tracked to closure by the Authorizing Official for ALIS and ODIN.

Deficientele amintite le-am gasit si la un incident cu un F-35 B prabusit in 2023

Atunci un pilot de F-35 s-a catapultat din avion, iar anchetatorii au concluzionat bizar ca desi pilotul a gresit si ca avionul era flyable, dovada ca nu s-a prabusit imediat , a mai zburat 11 minute si 21 secunde  dupa ce pilotul s-a catapultat  , nu se recomandau actiuni punitive impotriva pilotului.

Epava avionului s-a gasit mai greu , sunt detalii in raport.

The pilot safely ejected from the aircraft while attempting to execute a climbout during a missed approach in instrument meteorological conditions and heavy precipitation near Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina. The aircraft continued to fly unmanned for 11 minutes and 21 seconds before impacting in a rural area approximately 64 nautical miles northeast of the airfield in Williamsburg County, South Carolina.

The investigation concluded that the mishap occurred due to pilot error. 

The investigation concludes the mishap aircraft’s extended unmanned flight was due to stability provided by the F-35’s advanced automatic flight-control systems.

The loss of positive radar contact with the mishap aircraft resulted from a failed transponder caused by the electrical malfunction and the aircraft’s eventual descent below the air-traffic control radar horizon. The loss of positive contact could also be partially attributed to the F-35B’s low-observable technology.

The mishap resulted in no ground-related injuries, but it did result in property damage in the form of lost forested land and crops. There were no punitive actions recommended.

Nu prea inteleg de ce a fost vina pilotului, cand in raport se detaliaza niste defectiuni ale F-35 , care se regasesc  in raportul din ianuarie 2025 :

Contributing factors to the mishap included an electrical event during flight, which induced failures of both primary radios, the transponder, the tactical air navigation system, and the instrument landing system; and the probability that the helmet-mounted display and panoramic cockpit display were not operational for at least three distinct periods. This caused the pilot to become disoriented in challenging instrument and meteorological conditions. This electrical malfunction was not related to any maintenance activities. All preventative, scheduled, and unscheduled maintenance conducted on the aircraft was correct and in keeping with established standards

Io nu vad care e vina pilotului, ca dupa 3 defectiuni ale “helmet-mounted display and panoramic cockpit display” si dupa alte probleme,  electrice care au dus la “failures of both primary radios, the transponder, the tactical air navigation system, and the instrument landing system” sub  “heavy precipitation” pilotul a hotarat sa se catapulteze, ca doar nu trebuia sa astepte sa–si termine avionul combustibilul si sa moara in avion, precum comandantii japonezi de nave in ww2.

Ca a mai zburat avionul dupa catapultare, se mai intampla, asta nu inseamna ca era flyable, daca pilotul nu-l putea controla.

E celebru cazul MiG 23 din 1989 cand un pilot sovietic s-a catapultat in Polonia si avionul s-a prabusit dupa 900 de km in Belgia, acolo din pacate a fost un deces la locul prabusirii.

Pe accidentul F-35 B s-a pus batista pe tambal, respectiv ca pilotul e de vina , nu avionul, dar s-a dat la pace in sensul ca desi conform raportului pilotul e vinovat de pierderea unui avion de 100 milioane $ pilotul nu pateste nimic, important e sa nu se declare ca avionul avea defectiuni grave.

Ca o concluzie a raportului, mai e mult de munca la F-35, momentan LM nu poate furniza F-35 combat-ready, doar F-35 training , iar intretinerea F-35 e dificila chiar si pentru militarii americani.

Revenind la avioanele F-35 comandate de Romania, din pacate gasim multe potriviri si concluzii cu un articol Tehnomil, sincer articolul mi-a amintit de naravuri vechi romanesti de prin perioada interbelica

“Desi ne-ar placea sa credem ca noi nu sintem balcanici, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) ne demonstreaza contrariul.”

 Si daca ma uit la ce a scris Todor Tagarev gasesc motive de ingrijorare si pentru noi

Enabling Factors of Defense Corruption

Corruption is the abuse of a position of trust for dishonest gain. Corruption within the defense sector may take many forms: kickbacks and bribes, the awarding of non-competitive contracts, or the manipulation of soldier payrolls. The recent and rapid growth of private military and security companies—performing activities previously within the realm of the state that are outsourced within the constraints of still rather limited regulations—has further increased opportunities for graft. Below is a list of some of the rationales that facilitate corrupt practices in defense, namely “secrecy,” “urgency” and “concern for the people.” Although benign at first glance, the regular reference to these themes strongly limits the transparency of decision making and implementation, as well as the accountability of players in the defense sector, and thus creates a breeding ground for corruption.

• Secrecy is the first and worst enemy of transparency in defense. The prolific reference to secrecy in order to “protect national security interests” severely limits the opportunities for parliamentarian oversight and other forms of societal control of the executive branch. In defense procurement, for example, the reference to secrecy strongly limits the number of potential bidders, and can even lead to single-source procurement. That not only prevents competition but, as is too often the case, such schemes can also be deliberately designed and maintained in order to facilitate corrupt practices.

• The reference to urgency in meeting operational and other defense requirements allows for the implementation of simplified procedures or directly defying the rules (e.g., not holding open tenders and thus circumventing tender requirements for openness and competitiveness). A reference to urgency is often made in the defense establishments of new NATO members and Partner countries that contribute to international operations on an ad hoc basis or with “contingents” – i.e., units assembled for a single operational rotation. The need to meet urgent requirements, especially when combined with references to secrecy, creates an excellent ground for non-transparent and arbitrary decisions and, hence, for corruption.

• Populist slogans also often indicate corruption. One example is the call to “buy national” defense products and services, even when there are only a few or just a single national supplier of those products or services with questionable international competitiveness. Another example is the “concern for the soldiers’ well-being” that has led to non-transparent exchanges of redundant military properties for housing for the military, non-transparent recreation contracts, etc. A third example is the call to act in the “public benefit,” such as operating through offset arrangements that not only distort market mechanisms but also are conducive for paybacks in variety of ways.

This list is just a sample of the main “enemies” of transparency and accountability within the defense establishment. They are factors that also serve to increase the corruption potential of the defense sector, with abundant negative consequences.

Voi mentiona doar aspectele despre “secrecy” in achizitia de F-35 romanesti, respectiv  ca nu a spus nimeni ce cumparam de fapt, F-35 Block4, F-35 TR-2 sau F-35 TR-3 si la ce preturi , toata lumea buna a politicii si mass-mediei romanesti e foarte incantata ca dam 7 miliarde $ pe F-35 dar nu spune nimeni exact ce cumparam.

La un moment dat am crezut ca achizitia de F-35 e batuta in cuie, intre timp insa au aparut niste factori politici, economici si tehnici care ar putea modifica aceasta achizitie.

Factorul tehnologic e aparitia F-47

In cazul nostru, vom putea avea F-35 abia dupa 2030, cand s-ar putea ca F-47 sa fie deja operational sau sa devina operational la scurt timp dupace achizitionam noi F-35 , situatie ce nu ne avantajeaza, s-ar putea sa dam 7 miliarde parai pe un avion depasit, dar oricum nu cred ca mai putem schimba achizitia din F-35 in F-47, sunt  si producatori diferiti.

Partea politico-economica insa s-ar putea sa ingreuneze aceasta achizitie.

Ilie Bolojan, preşedintele interimar, face un anunţ surprinzător: Datele arată că în România creşterea economică s-a oprit

Datele prezentate oficial până în acest moment nu ar arăta că economia ar fi în stagnare, dar preşedintele nu a spus pe ce date se bazează.

Potrivit lui Bolojan, România se află la răscruce: poate fie să taie din cheltuieli, fie să mărească taxele, sau ambele. El a clarificat că reducerea cheltuielilor nu înseamnă concedieri fără noimă, ci gestionarea mai eficientă a banilor publici.

Adica nu prea mai sunt bani, deci va fi mai greu de gasit 7 miliarde $ pentru cea mai mare achizitie militara din istoria Romaniei.

O solutie ar fi folsirea de bani europeni pentru aceasta achizitie. Ursula von der Leyen a anuntat constituirea unui fond de 150 miliarde euro pentru achizitii de armament.

“The second proposal will be a new instrument. It will provide EUR 150 billion of loans to Member States for defence investment. This is basically about spending better – and spending together. We are talking about pan-European capability domains. For example: air and missile defence, artillery systems, missiles and ammunition drones and anti-drone systems; but also to address other needs from cyber to military mobility for example. It will help Member States to pool demand and to buy together. “

Doar ca diavolul se acunde in detalii

Pana aici numai de bine despre acest fond The Security Action for Europe – SAFE, dar ce mai aflam din conferinta de presa:

Will there be a “Buy European” clause for the spending? Will Member States be able to use the loans to buy products not made in Europe?  

Member States should purchase eligible products from entities established and headquartered in the EU, EEA/EFTA States and Ukraine. 

For war consumables (non complex products), Member States will have to ensure that components representing 65% of the costs of the end product originate from the Union/EEA EFTA countries/Ukraine. 

For complex systems, the same rule will apply, combined with the need for Member States to ensure the contractors fully control the design of the defence equipment. This to ensure we do not create new dependencies for complex systems. 

Asta inseamna ca nu e sigur daca Romania va putea cumpara F-35 accesand acest SAFE. Adevarul e ca ne-ar prinde bine sa folosim acest fond pentru achizitia de F-35, 7 miliarde $ pe niste avioane de lupta e o suma uriasa pentru orice tara , daramite pentru Romania .

Tarile EEA EFTA sunt Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway , deci nu apare nimic despre achizitia de armament american prin SAFE.

Din ce scrie FT rezulta ca Macron a reusit sa-si impuna punctul de vedere:

“Companiile de armament din SUA, Marea Britanie şi Turcia vor fi excluse dintr-un nou program de finanţare al apărării UE, în valoare de 150 de miliarde de euro, dacă ţările lor de origine nu semnează pacte de apărare şi securitate cu Bruxelles-ul, potrivit FT. 

Fondul planificat, destinat pentru achiziţia de armament, va fi disponibil doar pentru companii de apărare din UE şi din ţări terţe care au semnat acorduri de apărare cu blocul comunitar, potrivit unei propuneri a Comisiei Europene prezentate miercuri.

De asemenea, vor fi excluse orice sisteme de armament avansate asupra cărora o ţară terţă deţine „drept de control tehnologic” – adică impune restricţii privind construcţia, utilizarea anumitor componente sau controlul asupra utilizării finale a echipamentului.

Această prevedere ar exclude sistemul american de apărare antirachetă Patriot, fabricat de compania de apărare RTX, precum şi alte sisteme produse în SUA asupra cărora Washingtonul impune limite privind locurile în care pot fi folosite.

Această politică este o victorie pentru Franţa şi alte state care au cerut o abordare „Buy European” (Cumpără European) în ceea ce priveşte investiţiile în apărare ale continentului, pe fondul temerilor legate de fiabilitatea pe termen lung a SUA ca partener şi furnizor militar, generate de politicile fostului preşedinte Donald Trump.

Cel puţin 65% din costul produselor ar trebui cheltuit în UE, Norvegia şi Ucraina. Restul ar putea fi cheltuit pe produse provenite din ţări terţe care au semnat un pact de securitate cu UE.”

Adica e evidenta intentia lui Macron de a vinde Rafale in dauna F-35, am mai scris despre asta

“Noi însă vrem să oferim avioanele noastre Portugaliei. Este o țară din Uniunea Europeană și din NATO. Va avea aceleași nivel de interoperabilitate ca și noi în cadrul Alianței, așa că pare logic”, a spus Eric Trappier.

Anterior, pe 16 martie, președintele francez Emmanuel Macron a propus înlocuirea echipamentelor din sectorul american al apărării cu alternative europene.

„Celor care cumpără sisteme Patriot ar trebui să li se ofere sistemul franco-italian de apărare antiaeriană de nouă generație SAMP/T. Celor care cumpără F-35 ar trebui să li se ofere Rafale”, a precizat atunci Macron.

Timpul ne va arata daca vom cumpara F-35 si in ce conditii. Dar indiferent de cat mai lucreaza americanii la imbunatatirea F-35 , acest avion va ramane cu o mentenanta dificila , daca miltarilor americani le creaza probleme aceasta mentenanta, pentru militarii si personalul tehnic din Romania sper sa nu fie o problema insurmontabila mentinerea avioanelor F-35 la capacitatea de lupta Fully Mission Capable.

Autor: Caudillo